Since 1958 the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) has attempted to regulate the promotion of prescription medicines through its code of practice. This regulation is described and analysed for the six years 1983-8 using the reports on 302 complaints considered by its code of practice committee and annual reports.
Introduction
In 1958 the Association ofthe British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) introduced a voluntary code of practice to set standards for the promotion of prescription medicines in the United Kingdom. The code has been regularly revised.' It is administered by the ABPI's code of practice committee, which is chaired by an independent barrister and has 14 other members: 12 drawn from the senior management of member companies (at least four of them doctors) and two independent physicians from outside the industry.
The ABPI handles matters related to the code in three ways. Firstly, its secretariat scrutinises advertisements in a random selection of journals, checking that they comply with the code's legal and technical requirements. Secondly, since 1985 a medical consultant to the ABPI has made an independent scrutiny of random advertisements, examining their medical and scientific content and on occasion asking companies for data to substantiate the claims or statements made. Possible breaches so identified are pursued by informal correspondence with the company concerned. Lastly, cases not resolved informally by the secretariat or the independent consultant are considered by the code of practice committee, which also deals with all complaints originating outside the ABPI. These are the only complaints that are reported in detail.
Until 
Methods
The cases considered by the code of practice committee between January 1983 and December 1988 and reported in its Reports to ChiefExecutives were analysed by the date of the complaint, the type of complainant, the company, the product, the type of promotion concerned, and the nature of the breaches found or alleged. Where the committee found a breach we assessed whether this might also amount to a breach of the Medicines Act 1968 or regulations made under it or whether it was simply a breach of those sections of the ABPI's own code that concern matters of professional conduct, fair competition, taste (for example, depictions of the female form), and the reputation of the pharmaceutical industry.
The Medicines Act forbids promotion that is "likely to mislead as to the nature or quality of medicinal products. . . or as to their uses oreffects" (section 93 (7) Disparaging reference to other company 6 7 Requirements for printed material not met 39 Lederle (5), Glaxo (4) 8/9 Prohibited reference to official bodies or 4 NHS
10
Misleading artwork or graphs 5 11 Offences relating to reprints or quotations 5 12 Distribution of printed promotional 1 material 13 Information Cases directly dealt with by the ABPI secretariat are not reported individually, so we analysed the collective data about these from the association's annual reports.
Results
In the six years 1983-8 the code ofpractice committee processed 302 complaints. They were submitted mainly by doctors (143 complaints, ofwhich 63 were submitted by general practitioners), pharmaceutical companies (103), and pharmacists (27). Other sources included the Department of Health (6), consumer bodies (5), a member ofparliament (1), and the ABPI itself (9) . No source was mentioned for seven complaints.
The committee found breaches of the code in 192 (64%) of the complaints, including 77 (75%) of the complaints made by competing companies, 81 (57%) of those from doctors, and 13 (48%) from pharmacists.
Many of the complaints led the code of practice committee to identify more than one breach. In total the committee found 379 breaches, of which 270 (71%) were possible breaches of the Medicines Act. Table I shows the number found in each year; on average two were found for each complaint upheld. In the six years the number of possible breaches of the act tended to increase, while the incidence of other breaches of the code showed no consistent trend. Table II shows the numbers ofcomplaints dealt with informally or by the code of practice committee from 1983 to 1988. The ABPI annual reports suggest that of the 165 "technical and legal" complaints made internally and handled informally up to the end of 1988, 158 led to the identification of one or more breaches ofthe code, but the actual number is obscured by the ambiguous wording in the reports since 1985, and the ABPI has told us that "only the code ofpractice committee can definitively rule whether there has been an actual breach of the code." Of the possible breaches identified by the ABPI secretariat, over 90% were admitted to be breaches by the company concerned.
THE BREACHES FOUND
The breaches involved all parts of the code (table  III) . The rules that forbid misleading or unsubstantiated information and misleading claims or comparisons were broken most often. Thirteen companies were found to have brought discredit on or reduced confidence in the pharmaceutical industry (clause 2).
The figure shows how many breaches of the code the committee identified for 64 individual companies. The companies figuring most prominently were Organon (32 breaches), Smith Kline French (23), Glaxo (including Allen and Hanburys, and Duncan Flockhart) (21), A H Robins (18), Bayer (17), Merck Sharp and Dohme (17) , Lederle (16), Astra (14) , May and Baker (11), and Pharmax (11) . Fourteen companies were each represented by one breach; some did not appear at all. We found no clear relation between the size of a company or the size of its product range and the number of times the committee found it in breach of the code.
The highly skewed distribution of breaches among companies is partly explained by the finding that often the promotion of a single product led to a number of separate complaints and breaches of the code. Organon's promotion of Bolvidon led to three complaints (7 breaches) and that of Norcuron to two (25 (12) (') I (9) 10)
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Clause 19 of the code permits promotional gifts that are "inexpensive and relevant to the practice of medicine." The committee rejected eight complaints under this clause. Among the gifts the committee thought relevant to practice were a handmade mug, a book of cartoons depicting stressful situations, and a set of three walking sticks with stand. The cost of a Gladstone bag (about £50) was found acceptable as the company had offered only three as first prizes in a promotional competition. We note that the committee received no complaints about gifts of calculators or computers in connection with postmarketing surveillance, which have been reported in the press, but such a complaint was upheld in 1989, after the period covered in our review.'
Discussion
Our review of the reports of the ABPI and its code of practice committee for the years 1983-8 showed that the code is commonly broken. It is not possible to discover exact numbers, but during this period about 550 breaches were noted and a further undeclared number would have been found by the ABPI's medical consultant and dealt with privately. A further considerable number must have escaped attention because few health professionals bother to complain to the ABPI. It has been rare for the same advertisement to attract more than one complaint. We estimate in round numbers that 600 breaches were detected in six yearsthat is, about 100 a year. This may seem a small number in relation to the huge amount of promotion, but a single breach may represent an advertisement published many times. An advertisement hardly ever appears in only one issue of one journal. Where breaches of the Medicines Act are concerned, each separate act of publication (that is, in one issue of a journal) is a separate offence.
Our analysis suggests that over 70% of the breaches of the code identified by the committee (270 out of 379) also involved possible breaches of the Medicines Act; the proportion among those dealt with by the secretariat may be similar, but because the data are not published we could not analyse them. It can, however, be difficult to decide whether a breach of the code is also a possible breach of the act because points that essentially correspond have been drafted differently in the two texts. For this reason, wherever a voluntary code is being established the drafting should ensure that its relation to the law is clear and explicit.
The . .
Orient Express,9 "' and E Merck's withdrawal of research funding from a professor of surgery who refused to promote the use of the company's product in his hospital" were also considered discreditable. We did not attempt to assess the seriousness of different breaches ourselves because the criteria would inevitably be subjective. There might be general agreement about which were serious and which trivial but not on those in between. Neither the code nor the act indicates the gravity of different offences.
NEGLECT BY MINISTERS
The Medicines Act drew heavily on the recommendations of the Sainsbury report,'2 which was primarily concerned with the control of pharmaceutical promotion. The act accordingly provides regulations for controlling promotion (sections 108-110) and makes health ministers responsible for enforcing them. Ministers have not fulfilled this duty, and by abrogating their responsibility to the ABPI they have allowed many hundreds of possible breaches to escape consideration by the criminal courts (for example, under section 93). The Department of Health's case is that the industry should for several reasons be encouraged to regulate itself: the industry has the expertise and is willing to do the work, and the department saves money and bureaucratic effort and avoids potentially troublesome confrontations with the industry, which it officially sponsors.
The department has been active on occasions. The ABPI is proud of its code but seems blind to its shortcomings, claiming that "An outstanding feature has been the success of voluntary compliance with the provisions of the Code and acceptance of the rulings of the Committee. It has not been found necessary to apply sanctions to secure compliance because members of the association are anxious to ensure that their marketing activities conform to the highest standard."' Nevertheless, during the period of our review the successful prosecution of Roussel, continuing public criticism of improper promotion, and official warnings from the Department of Health may have made the ABPI more active in monitoring advertisements and soliciting complaints. Our survey shows that companies are good at recognising breaches, but this has not led them to commit fewer of them. The data do not reveal any obvious deterrent effect of the code.
Even if voluntary compliance with the code were as successful as the ABPI claims, it must be noted that its standards are those determined by the industry; the public, which is endangered by misleading or otherwise incorrect promotion, is neither informed nor consulted. The ABPI's wish to secure compliance with the code seems 
The ABPI gives virtually no adverse publicity to companies found to have breached the code. The only sanction it can impose is to suspend an offending company from membership of the association; this has been done once in 30 years. The ABPI requires an undertaking that the breach will not be repeated, but companies do not always seem to honour this. The ABPI has no power to require an offender to retract or correct a misleading statement.
This contrasts with the position in the United States, where the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) frequently issues "regulatory letters" to companies making false or misleading promotional claims, requiring corrective advertising or a "Dear Doctor"' letter. However, an official of the FDA has recently said that "the vast majority" of promotional materials submitted for consideration by the FDA are false or misleading in some respect but that the agency can take regulatory action in only about 5% of cases, mainly because it lacks resources. ' The students are finishing up the protocols in the school and the technicians still documenting, preserving, and storing the specimens for future reference. Accompanying my chief, Professor Aluizio Prata, we stroll down to the river. Like most of the areas where we work on schistosomiasis it is the only source of water for bathing, washing, and drinking. Later, in the heat of the day, we will see these same children bathing from the little beach. Looking under the vegetation hanging over the water we quickly find the vector snail Biomphalania glabrata, and, putting two or three in a glass of water in the sunlight, we can just see the cercarias being shed by the snails into the water. This is the minute, tadpole like infective form for humans, which enters the skin within minutes to produce eventually the adult worm in the portal circulation. Fertile pairs of worms give rise to the characteristic eggs in the stool, and such eggs induce the severe portal fibrosis, producing presinusoidal portal hypertension as seen in Jose.
Theoretically you could break this parasitic life cycle at least at three points: the shedding of eggs into the environment, the snail, and humans. Rural Brazilians are often broadcast defecators, and latrine building has not been a great success. They get turned into storage rooms or chicken houses. Educational programmes are hard to implement. Like all mammals we live in an environment contaminated by our own faeces. It is a question of degree. Witness the famous unpublished experiment in an American middle class home where after the family had ingested fluorescein ultraviolet light picked up the dye on the mantelpiece, the cutlery, etc. The experiment was not published because the Americans are already obsessional about washing their hands and what else can you do?
So the eggs get into the water and the infective form for the snail, the miracidium, produces innumerable
